内容简介:

We study whether investor voice can help address global externalities under fragmented regulation. In our setting, a multinational firm generates externalities across jurisdictions, national regulators face political frictions that can impede corrective regulation, and policy differences create scope for regulatory arbitrage and production leakage. We compare two channels of investor influence: corporate stewardship, which affects firms' global operations, and policy advocacy, which affects local regulation. Both channels can help address global externalities, but their relative effectiveness depends on political frictions abroad. When these frictions are severe enough to prevent foreign regulation, leakage weakens policy advocacy but strengthens stewardship. When foreign regulation is politically feasible, however, stewardship can crowd out foreign regulation and reinforce policy miscoordination, while local policy advocacy can crowd in foreign regulation and reduce externalities abroad.

演讲人简介：

Doron Levit, Professor of Business Economics and Marion B. Ingersoll Professor of Finance. He received his PhD from Stanford University in 2011. His expertise covers business valuation, corporate finance, corporate governance, financial economics, mergers and acquisitions, payout policy, and private equity. He was a Lecturer (2010‑2011) and then Assistant Professor (2011‑2020) in the Department of Finance at The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. His research has been published in leading academic journals including Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, The Review of Financial Studies, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, and Duke Law Journal.

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