题　目：The Implications of Pay Range Transparency on Job Application Preferences and Negotiations

嘉　宾：Tae-Youn Park, Professor, Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU)

主　持：欧阳璨, 副教授, 上海交通大学

时　间：2026年4月13日（周一）13:30-15:00

地　点：上海交通大学 徐汇校区安泰楼B207室

内容简介:

Pay range transparency laws, which require employers to disclose salary ranges in job postings, have gained traction as a strategy for narrowing the gender pay gap by strengthening workers’ access to pay information. However, these policies often give employers considerable latitude in setting how wide or narrow those ranges are, raising questions about whether certain implementations might inadvertently sustain—or even exacerbate—existing wage disparities. Our research addresses this issue by examining how the width of disclosed pay ranges influences women’s and men’s job application and negotiation behaviors, and whether providing more clarity around typical salary outcomes can mitigate these unintended consequences. Across four studies—encompassing a large archival dataset (Study 1), surveys and field experiments with prospective and actual job seekers (Studies 2 and 3), and an experimental intervention (Study 4)—we consistently find that women exhibit a stronger preference for jobs with narrower pay ranges than men, largely driven by women’s higher risk aversion. Moreover, choosing narrower pay ranges is associated with less assertive negotiation behaviors, suggesting a path through which pay range disclosures may perpetuate gender gaps in compensation. By providing explicit information about typical starting salary and the criteria used to determine final offers, we show that organizations can reduce these effects and support more equitable outcomes, offering practical insights for policymakers and employers aiming to ensure that pay transparency fulfills its aim of closing, rather than reinforcing, the gender wage gap.

演讲人简介：

Tae-Youn Park is the Professor of Management in the SKKU Business School, Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU). He is also Director of Research in Institute for Compensation Studies in the ILR School, Cornell University. Tae-Youn’s research focuses on finding ways to achieve a balanced, mutually beneficial employment relationships. With this goal, Tae-Youn examines how employment policies and practices, such as incentives and rewards practices (e.g., parental leave) and employee turnover, affect both employers and employees. His work has been published in many leading journals across disciplines, including Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management Annals, Psychological Bulletin, Journal of Applied Psychology, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, and Strategic Management Journal. He currently serves on the editorial board of Academy of Management Journal, Journal of Applied Psychology, Personnel Psychology, and others.

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