题　目：Robust (Decentralized) Oracle Design

嘉　宾：张磊夫 助理教授 香港科技大学-广州

主持人：张大可 助理教授 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院

时　间：2025年11月26日（周三）13:30-15:00

地　点：上海交通学 徐汇校区安泰浩然楼306

内容简介:

An oracle is a node that supplies blockchain smart contracts with external data that the blockchain itself cannot access. However, the oracle problem—ensuring that such data is accurate and resistant to manipulation—remains a fundamental challenge. I study the design of compensation mechanisms and aggregation

methods for decentralized oracles—comprising adversarial and strategic nodes—to incentivize truthful reporting and robustly aggregate dispersed information into a consensus. I establish an impossibility result: Robust compensation mechanisms,

under which truthful reporting constitutes a strict Nash equilibrium for strategic nodes regardless of adversarial nodes’ reporting strategies, generally do not exist. Moreover, I stress that the popular aggregating method for obtaining a consensus may fail even without an adversary and ignores the intrinsically high-dimensional structure of decentralized oracles. I demonstrate that adversarial nodes, which appear normal in every single dimension, can be detected from a “global” view using state-of-the-art machine learning algorithms.

演讲人简介：

Prof. Leifu Zhang is a financial economist with training in computer science, particularly in machine learning. He is currently an assistant professor in FinTech at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou). He did his postdoc at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business and holds a PhD in Finance from Washington University in St. Louis. He also studied at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (MPhil) and Peking University (LLB and BS).

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