题   目：Hobbesian wars and institutional safeguards

嘉   宾：Yang Xie, Assistant  Professor/Visiting Assistant Professo, University of California, Riverside/Tsinghua  University

主持人：张磊，教授，上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院

时   间：2023年6月15日（周四）12:40-14:10

地   点：上海交通大学（徐汇校区）安泰经济与管理学院B207

内容简介：

This  paper formalizes the principle that persecution power of government may  generate violent contests over it. We show that this principle yields a large  set of theoretical insights on different institutions that can help to preempt  such contests under different socio-economic conditions. When socio-economic  cohesion is low, the risk of contests can be eliminated only by individual  veto against persecution. Moreover, such unanimity rule is resilient to  institutional shocks only when the chief executive does not control the  legislative agenda. When socio-economic cohesion is high, the risk of violent  contests can be eliminated without individual veto, but only by a  persecution-reviewing judiciary whose members cannot join the executive branch  in the future. Our results shed light on the evolution of political  institutions in European history.

演讲人简介：

Yang Xie is  an Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of California,  Riverside, and a Visiting Assistant Professor at Tsinghua University. He is  also affiliated with the 21st Century China Center at the University of  California, San Diego, as a Non-resident Scholar. His research interests  include political and comparative economics and environmental and resource  economics.

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