讲座：Irreversible Investment in Technology and the Dynamics of Public Good Provision 发布时间：2023-03-10
题 目：Irreversible Investment in Technology and the Dynamics of Public Good Provision
嘉 宾：邓留纯，Assistant Professor，Yale-NUS College
We analyze a model of public good provision and technology investment when two parties alternate in power stochastically. In each period, the incumbent decides how much public good to provide and how much to invest in a technology that lowers the cost of public good provision in the future. The two parties place differential weights on the public good, and this difference is taken to be the index of polarization. We obtain the following results in Markov Perfect equilibrium in the infinite-horizon game. (i) When polarization is low, steady state distribution is invariant to the degree of reversibility of the investment. When polarization is high, both parties provide more public good in steady state when investment is irreversible than when reversible. (ii) Higher power turnover results in higher levels of technology stock and more public good provision if polarization is low. (iii) Under high power turnover, as parties get more polarized, the expected technology stock and provision of public good in steady state first fall, then jump upward when irreversibility binds.
Liuchun Deng is an assistant professor of economics at Yale-NUS College. His research focuses on the labor market and productivity consequences of automation and international trade. He also works on the theory of economic dynamics with applications to development, political economy, and trade. Liuchun Deng holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Johns Hopkins University.