题    目: Monopsony and Backloaded Compensation: Theory and Evidence from Public Accountants

嘉    宾: Bernardo S. Silveira   Professor, University of Zurich

主持人: 闵炜程 副教授, 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院

时    间: 2026年9月23日（周三）下午14:00-15:30

地    点: 上海交通大学徐汇校区安泰经济与管理学院A503

内容简介：In monopsony models, wage markdowns induce deadweight loss and are therefore inefficient. Yet markdowns also arise in models with backloaded efficiency pay, where they are designed to induce effort among early-career workers and are thus efficient. To reconcile—and empirically distinguish—these two mechanisms, we build a dynamic model incorporating labor market power and endogenous effort. Estimating a team production model on novel data on U.S. public accounting firms, we find evidence of both: markdowns for junior workers and markups for senior ones reflect incentive-providing backloading, while monopsony power induces a ’lifetime’ wage markdown of 15%.

演讲人简介： Bernardo S. Silveira is a Professor at the University of Zurich and an Assistant Professor at the University of California, Los Angeles, where he is currently on leave for the 2026–2027 academic year. His research interests include applied microeconomics, law and economics, political economy, and industrial organization.