题    目：Identity-Compatible Auctions

嘉    宾：曾皓原  Ph.D．candidate 苏黎世大学

主持人： 喻   洋  副教授 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院

时    间： 2025年12月26日（周五）14:00-15:30 

地    点:  上海交通大学徐汇校区安泰经济与管理学院A511

内容简介：This paper studies the incentives of the seller and buyers to shill bid in a single-item auction. An auction is seller identity-compatible if the seller cannot profit from pretending to be one or more bidders via fake identities. It is buyer identity-compatible if no buyer profits from posing as more than one bidder. Lit auctions reveal the number of bidders, whereas dark auctions conceal the information. We characterize three classic selling mechanismsfirst-price, second-price, and posted-price—based on identity compatibility. We show the importance of concealing the number of bidders, which enables the implementation of a broader range of outcome rules. In particular, no optimal lit auction is ex-post seller identity-compatible, while the dark first-price auction (with reserve) achieves the goal.

演讲人简介：Haoyuan Zeng is a Ph.D. candidate in Economics at theUniversity of Zurich. He is a microeconomic theorist. His research focuses on market design, auctions, and dynamic games.

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