讲座:Supplier-Side Mechanism Design for Platforms in a Sharing Economy when Supplier Cost Is Private 发布时间:2025-12-04

嘉 宾:张成龙 助理教授 香港中文大学(深圳)

主持人:房思含 助理教授 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院

时  间:2025年12月9日(周二)13:30-15:00

地  点:上海交通大学徐汇校区安泰楼A305

 

内容简介:

Platforms in a sharing economy match suppliers that provide a service with consumers who seek that service. The matching platform charges a price to the consumer and pays a wage to the supplier in every match. Determining the optimal matching mechanism for the platform is challenging because of heterogeneity on both supplier and consumer sides (suppliers vary in their service quality and cost and consumers vary in their valuations), private information (supplier cost is private), match interdependence (a supplier can be matched with at most one consumer and vice versa), and match-dependent platform value (value to the platform depends on who is matched with whom). We derive the optimal mechanism --- which includes the prices charged to consumers, wages offered to suppliers, and the matching rule --- for a sharing economy platform. We quantify the extent of gain the platform can achieve by adopting the optimal mechanism in place of the prevalent fixed-commission-rate scheme, in which the platform takes a fixed percentage of the price paid by the consumer as commission. Furthermore, we show that our optimal mechanism or minor variations of it has the potential to offer substantial gains under a wide variety of conditions. Our study extends the vast literature on mechanism design to sharing economy contexts.

 

演讲人简介:

Chenglong Zhang is an Assistant Professor of Information Systems at The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen. His research interests are in sharing economy, economics of information security, fairness and AI, and blockchain. His papers have been published/accepted in Management Science, Information Systems Research, MIS Quarterly, and among others.

 

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