主持人： 陆卓然 助理教授 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院

时    间：2025年12月3日（周三）14:00-15:30

地    点:  上海交通大学徐汇校区安泰经济与管理学院A303

内容简介：

A vote buyer simultaneously offers voters personalized bribes asking them to vote for a proposal that is against their interests under general voting rules. Multiple equilibria typically arise: Either all voters or any maximal losing coalition accept their bribes and vote for the proposal. I show that this stylized vote-buying game is a potential game, and therefore a well-justified equilibrium selection criterion, potential maximization, is applicable. Under potential maximization, the buyer’s set of optimal bribes is the aspiration core of the dual simple game, concepts that are well studied in cooperative game theory. For constant-sum weighted voting rules, the buyer optimally bribes all voters with bribes proportional to their number of votes. My analysis provides a non-cooperative foundation for (a modification of) the aspiration core as a power index.

演讲人简介：

Lester Chan is an Assistant Professor at Southern University of Science and Technology Business School. Before that, he was an Assistant Professor in Economics at Xiamen University. He received his Ph.D. in Economics from Boston University in 2021. His research interests are microeconomic theory and industrial organization, with a focus on contract theory, business economics, platforms, and potential games. He has published in various leading journals, including solo-authored papers in The RAND Journal of Economics, Management Science, and Theoretical Economics.