题　目：Surplus Reduction and Managerial Incentives in Local Governments

嘉　宾：陈希（Xi Chen） Assistant Professor University of Bristol

主持人：李烁 助理教授 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院

时　间：2025年9月24日（周三）14:00-15:30

地　点：上海交通大学 徐汇校区安泰楼A503室

内容简介:

We investigate the relationship between agency problems and local governments’ accounting discretion. Specifically, we examine whether local municipalities use accounting discretion opportunistically to hide profits from taxpayers. Our findings reveal that those with budget surpluses employ negative accruals to counteract the positive impact of rising property values on their financial statements. This practice weakens in jurisdictions with high reporting quality but intensifies where property tax revenues respond more strongly to rising property values and where legal limits on tax increases are weaker. Furthermore, the practice is more pronounced in areas where managerial compensation is closely tied to property tax and accounting discretion, where managers are more accountable to voters, and where voters have a greater innate dislike of property taxes. These findings underscore how accounting manipulation can obscure agency issues, distort managerial incentives, and result in real economic costs in the public sector.

演讲人简介：

Xi Chen is a Lecturer in Accounting at University of Bristol. His research interest lies in Disclosure, Regulation, ESG and Corporate Cybersecurity. He holds a PhD in Business Administration and Management from Bocconi University.

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