嘉    宾： Allen Vong 助理教授 新加坡国立大学

主持人： 闵炜程 助理教授 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院  

时    间： 2025年5月14日（周三）14:00-15:30

地    点:  上海交通大学徐汇校区安泰经济与管理学院A511

内容简介：

A worker interacts with a sequence of clients under a manager’s supervision. I highlight a novel role of this manager’s mediation in addressing the worker’s moral hazard, namely to intertemporally reduce suspensions of the worker’s service that are surplus-depleting but crucially serve as punishments to motivate her costly effort. I show that, to best address moral hazard, the manager at times secretly asks a high-performing worker to scale down her effort against a current client and implements dynamic correlation by telling the worker that current underperformance will not be punished. These occasions are frequent in the short run and eventually disappear.

演讲人简介：

Allen Vong is Assistant Professor of Economics, National University of Singapore. He received his Ph.D. in Economics from Yale University in 2021. His academic interests range from game theory to the theory of industrial organization.