嘉    宾： 陶学臻  副教授 上海财经大学

主持人： 陆卓然 助理教授 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院  

时    间： 2025年5月7日（周三）14:00-15:30

地    点:  上海交通大学徐汇校区安泰经济与管理学院A511

内容简介：

This paper examines how market structure and government policy shape the diffusion of medical innovations through hospitals. Using detailed patient-level data from Taiwan's National Health Insurance system, we estimate a structural model of hospital competition in drug-eluting stent (DES) markets. Our model incorporates patient demand for DES treatments and hospitals' strategic decisions regarding DES portfolio composition and pricing. Counterfactual analyses reveal three key findings: First, increased competition reduces DES prices but decreases hospitals' incentives to adopt new DES models, resulting in partial innovation passthrough. Second, selective contracting can achieve quadruple wins by simultaneously increasing consumer surplus, maintaining hospitals' adoption incentives, controlling government expenditures, and motivating covered manufacturers to offer wholesale discount for sales gains. Third, patient coupons targeting the poorest 10% can redistribute consumer surplus towards low-income patients, but has limited impact on overall market outcomes. These results highlight the importance of considering both market structure and reimbursement design in promoting medical innovation diffusion.

演讲人简介：

陶学臻，上海财经大学商学院产业经济系副教授，主要研究方向为反垄断分析和产品创新。主持完成国家自然科学基金青年基金项目。论文发表于American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Journal of Industrial Economics等经济学国际期刊。