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The Cooperation Problem 2022-12-19

Subject:The Cooperation Problem

Guest:Li Xiangliang,Assistant Professor,School of Finance, Nankai University

Host:Min Weicheng,Assistant Professor,ACEM of SJTU

Time:Wednesday, December 21, 2022 11:30-13:00

Venue:Tencent Meeting


In this paper, we propose an opposite model of noncooperative games (Nash, 1951): The Cooperation Problem. In this model, players can choose nothing but cooperation. We show that within this model, an ideal solution can be identified via sentiments (formally implemented in an axiomatic approach) as opposed to the Nash equilibrium identified within noncooperative games via rationality. Despite their oppositeness, the two models are complementary. We show that the cooperation problem helps solve the equilibrium selection problem---a notorious challenge of noncooperative games. And by combining the two models, we propose a new solution of normal-form games that describes “standards of behavior”---an initial quest of game theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944).

Guest Bio:

Xiangliang Li is an Assistant Professor at the School  of Finance, Nankai University. He obtained his PhD in economics from Yale  University in 2021. His research interests are in game theory, public  economics, and international trade.