【Abstract】  Enron’s pay-for-performance plans incited executives to practice mark-to-market accounting and a rank-and-yank performance review system to increase profits and reduce costs. Corruption involves greed, money, transparency, and decision-making. The theory of planned behavior asserts that attitudes, perceived social norms, and control predict behavioral intentions, that, in turn, predict actual behavior. In the business ethics literature, numerous studies support the relationships that attitudes predict self-reported behavioral intentions (Attitudes → Behavioral Intentions). However, very few empirical studies have empirically documented the relationships between attitudes (avaricious monetary aspirations, the love of money attitudes, or greed in laypersons' terms) and actual behaviors (cheating) (Attitudes → Actual Behaviors) in experiments. Prospect theory frames decision-making in the gains-losses domain and high-low probability. We theorize: Decision-makers apply their deep-rooted personal values (the love of money attitudes/avaricious monetary aspirations) and frame their critical concern in the immediate-proximal context of pay satisfaction and dissatisfaction (gains-losses domain) and the omnibus-distal context of high-low transparency, that is, open class rooms and private opaque cubicles (high-low probability of risk) to maximize expected utilities (cheating for financial gains) and ultimate serenity (happiness). In this chapter, experimenters assign participants randomly to high-low transparency (open rooms vs. private cubicles) and manipulate pay satisfaction and dissatisfaction (high vs. low), and classify them into two groups (high vs. low avaricious monetary aspirations/greed). Phase 1 establishes the baseline performance of the matching task and matrix task. In Phase 2, after completing identical tasks, we manipulate their pay satisfaction or dissatisfaction for the first matching task. Paying them below the reference point puts them in the domain of losses (gains). Using the pay-for-performance plan for the matrix task, experimenters instruct participants to shred their performance evidence and redeem their “self-reported performance” for cash. Our experiments demonstrate the following findings. In open classrooms, participants reveal little cheating, regardless of pay satisfaction or dissatisfaction, illustrating risk aversion. However, in private cubicles, participants with pay dissatisfaction display the highest intensity between the love-of-money attitude and cheating, demonstrating avaricious justice-seeking dishonesty. Greedy people with pay dissatisfaction and low transparency reveal the highest (aspiration-to-cheating) intensity in pay-for-performance experiments. Our results establish the relationships between attitudes and cheating behaviors, supporting the theory of planned behavior, self-reported behavioral intentions in the literature, the link between intentions and behaviors, and Enron executives' corruption and scandals. Most importantly, we offer a predictive validity in that individuals' love of money attitudes predict cheating behaviors, corruption, and dishonesty, making significant contributions to the literature. We provide novel implications for behavioral economics, business ethics, and social unrest.