讲座：Platform Entry and Merchant Proﬁts under Quality Uncertainty: Multi-Agent Price Signaling
题 目：Platform Entry and Merchant Proﬁts under Quality Uncertainty: Multi-Agent Price Signaling
嘉 宾：邱烨 助理教授 同济大学经济与管理学院
主持人：王良燕 教授 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院
时 间：2021年5月12日（周三） 14:00-15:30
Merchants are wary of a platform entering as a competitor and adversely aﬀecting sales and margins. A platform wanting to maximize proﬁts is interested also in gaining consumer trust and conﬁdence by providing credible quality information to consumers. As a practical matter, could a platform benefit by entering, the resulting multi-sender price signaling alleviating consumers’ uncertainty of quality? Further, can a merchant also benefit from platform entry? We answer these questions by analyzing strategic pricing by a platform and merchant under quality uncertainty. We innovate by modeling platform-merchant competition in a leader-follower framework and characterizing the sub-game perfect pricing strategy that is also PBE with consumers resolving quality uncertainty using both platform and merchant prices. We find that platform entry expands the possibility of separating equilibria that inform consumers of quality. Consumers benefit also by lower prices and/or increased market coverage. Critical to our results is signaling by two senders, the merchant playing a key role. A counterintuitive result is that channel profits can be higher despite increased competition, and conditions exist for an equilibrium outcome identical to complete information. Even more interesting, the platform, merchant and consumers could all be made better off by platform entry.
Ye Qiu is Assistant Professor of Marketing at Tongji University in the Advanced Institute of Business. She holds a PhD in marketing from the University of Texas at Dallas, MBA from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and B.Econ from Nanjing University. She is interested in digital marketing strategies with emphasis on online pricing and advertising, platform design and consumer search. Her research analyzes firms’ online strategies theoretically using game-theoretic modeling and empirically through Bayesian methods. Her research has been published in Marketing Sciences.