讲座：Mandatory Retirement of Subnational Leaders as a Governance Mechanism for State-owned Enterprises
题 目：Mandatory Retirement of Subnational Leaders as a Governance Mechanism for State-owned Enterprises
嘉 宾：程 华 助理教授 南开大学金融学院
主持人：许文健 助理教授 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院
地 点：上海交通大学 徐汇校区安泰楼A303室
State-owned Enterprises (SOEs) often pursue aggressive investment strategies. Using a novel measure of over-investment, we show that SOEs' over-investment is less severe when the local mayor is close to mandatory retirement age in China. Moreover, during nationwide turnover years, SOEs in cities with younger mayors overinvest much more relative to SOEs in cities retiring mayors. Further evidence shows that SOEs only overinvest less when retiring mayors are less aggressive in pursuing economic indicators. Moreover, an alternative measure of promotion chance also implies that the lower such chance, the less incentive for mayors to encourage overinvestment by SOEs.
程华，南开大学金融学院助理教授。他分别在北京大学和德克萨斯大学奥斯汀分校获得学士和博士学位，主要研究方向是公司金融、金融机构和公共经济学。他的研究成果发表在Journal of Corporate Finance, Journal of Financial Stability, Pacific Economic Review等国际期刊上。