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# Dynamic Pricing and Matching for Two-Sided Queues

#### 2020-04-16

Dynamic Pricing and Matching for Two-Sided Queues

Speaker：He Wang, Assistant professor, Georgia Institute of Technology

Host：Assistant Professor Li Chengzhang

Time：Thursday，April 16th，2020， 9:30-11:00

Venue：ZOOM

Motivated by diverse applications in sharing economy and online marketplaces, we consider optimal pricing and matching control in a two-sided queueing system.  We assume that heterogeneous customers and servers arrive to the system with price-dependent arrival rates. The compatibility between servers and customers is specified by a bipartite graph. Once a pair of customer and server are matched, they depart from the system instantaneously. The objective is to maximize long-run average profits of the system while minimizing average waiting time. We first propose a static pricing and max-weight matching policy, which achieves $O(\sqrt{\eta})$ optimality rate when all of the arrival rates are scaled by $\eta$. We further show that a dynamic pricing and modified max-weight matching policy achieves an improved $O(\eta^{1/3})$ optimality rate. Under a broad class of pricing policies, we prove that any matching policy has an optimality rate that is lower bounded by $\Omega(\eta^{1/3})$. Thus, the dynamic pricing policy and modified max-weight matching policy achieves the optimal rate.  In addition, we propose a constraint generation algorithm that solves an approximation of the MDP and demonstrate strong numerical performance of this algorithm.