讲座：Weight-Ranked Divide-and-Conquer Contracts
题 目：Weight-Ranked Divide-and-Conquer Contracts
嘉 宾：Lester Chan 博士生 Boston University
主持人：钱军辉 教授 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院
时 间：2020年 12月26日（周六） 08:30--10:00
地 点：上海交通大学 徐汇校区安泰楼A507
This paper studies bilateral contracting between one principal and multiple agents. Multiple equilibria arise due to agents’ strategic interactions. In general, the principal’s optimal contracting scheme varies with the choice of equilibrium selection criterion or implementation requirement. Nevertheless, for a large class of models where agents’ payoffs constitute a weighted potential game, I show that one contracting scheme is optimal for a large class of equilibrium selection criteria and implementation requirements. This scheme ranks agents in ascending order of their weights in the weighted potential game and induces them to accept their offers in a dominance-solvable way, starting from the first agent. With the general results, I derive robust predictions and policy guidance for a wide variety of applications, including networks and pure/impure public goods/bads.
Lester Chan is a Ph.D. candidate in Economics at Boston University. His fields of research are microeconomic theory and industrial organization, with a special interest in potential games, contract theory, and platforms. His current research focuses on overcoming the challenge of multiple equilibria in various principal(s)-agents problems. In addition to his job market paper, Lester has another solo-authored working paper entitled “Divide and Conquer in Two-Sided Markets: A Potential-Game Approach,” which is currently revise and resubmit at RAND Journal of Economics.