讲座：Dual Ownership and Risk-taking Incentives in Managerial Compensation
题 目：Dual Ownership and Risk-taking Incentives in Managerial Compensation
嘉 宾：Qifei Zhu, Assistant Professor, Department of Finance, Nanyang Business School
主持人：王宇曦 助理教授 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院金融系
会议方式：ZOOM 会议 (校内师生如需会议号和密码，请于5月12日中午12点前发送电邮至wangmeng316@sjtu.edu.cn获取)
This paper studies how shareholder-creditor conflicts shape firms' executive compensation. Firms with higher ownership by "dual holders" - institutional investors that simultaneously hold equity and bond of the company - adopt less risk-inducing compensation structures: They use fewer option-based incentives and more inside debt for CEO pay. Exploiting financial institution mergers that create dual holders for portfolio companies, we identify a causal link between dual ownership and CEO compensation policies. We further examine within-proposal variation in mutual fund proxy voting data and show that dual holders vote in ways that reduce future risk-taking incentives.
Prof. Zhu received his PhD at the University of Texas at Austin, United States. He obtained a BA in Economics at the Zhejiang University in Hangzhou, and a MS in Finance at the Tulane University, United States. His research interests are on institutional investors, mutual funds and empirical corporate finance. His work has been published in top journals such as Management Science.