讲座：Rebate Policies in Large Group Threshold Public Goods Provision: Theory and Experiment
题 目：Rebate Policies in Large Group Threshold Public Goods Provision: Theory and Experiment
嘉 宾：Yun Wang, Assistant Professor, Xiamen University
主持人：张磊 教授 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院
时 间：2019年12月25日（周三） 14:30-16:00
地 点：上海交通大学 徐汇校区包图 A303
This paper investigates threshold-public-goods provision with the budget-balancing condition. The condition is achieved through rebate policies. In addition to the proportional rebate (PR) and winner-take-all (WTA) rebate policies from the literature, we introduce two novel rules: the uniform price cap (UPC) and the uniform price auction (UPA). Both feature endogenously determined prices and discriminatory payment rules. We conduct two large-group experiments to examine the efficiency property of these rebate policies. Our results show that, over-contribution exists and efficient provision rates are higher under the UPC and UPA mechanisms, while over-contribution does not appear under the PR or WTA rebate rules. The latter result differs from the findings of Ronbeau et.al.(1999) and Spencer et.al.(2009), in which the provision threshold is unknown to subjects. Our belief elicitation results show that, subjects expect the provision threshold to be much higher than the actual, and their contributions are significantly higher than the optimal levels calculated from reported beliefs of others' contributions. Moreover, group contribution declines once subjects are informed of the exact provision threshold and when decisions are repeated. It suggests that the over-contribution phenomenon from the literature might have arisen from the uncertainty in the information environment.
Yun Wang, assistant professor at the WangYanan Institute for Studies in Economics, Xiamen University. Prof. Wang received her Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Pittsburgh. Her research revolves around game theory, mechanism design, experimental economics, and behavioral economics. The present paper focuses on experimental test of efficient public good provision mechanisms.