讲座：Controlling Developed-Market Subsidiaries via Human Resource Management: Evidence from Chinese Multinational Corporations
题 目：Controlling Developed-Market Subsidiaries via Human Resource Management: Evidence from Chinese Multinational Corporations
嘉 宾：Can Ouyang, Ph.D. Student in the School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University.
主持人：赵小平 副教授 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院
时 间：2019年11月06日（周三） 10:00-11:30
地 点：上海交通大学 徐汇校区 包图A303
Even though the presence of Chinese multinational corporations (MNCs) in developed economies have grown substantially, the knowledge about how these firms manage their developed-market subsidiaries remain rather scant. This study applies agency theory to explore how ownership type influences Chinese MNCs’ control over developed-market subsidiaries. Findings based on the qualitative data and survey data collected from Chinese MNCs demonstrate that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private-sector businesses (PSBs) experience different agency problems in developed markets and thus apply different control strategies. SOEs tend to adopt a hybridization control system that separates the management of home-country expatriates and employees hired locally, whereas PSBs are likely to implement a relational control system that strengthens the interdependence between headquarters and subsidiaries. This study provides implications to the literature on agency theory and control theory and advances the research of emerging market MNCs.
Can Ouyang is a PhD student from the School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University. His research interests fall into the domains of strategic human resource management, international business, and organization theory. A key focus of his research is to explore how ownership structure influences organizational control and human resource management.