讲座：Strategic Inventory and Supplier Encroachment
题 目： Strategic Inventory and Supplier Encroachment
讲座嘉宾：Huiqi Guan, Ph.D. candidate in operations management at the School of Business Administration，University of Miami
In a two-period model of a dyadic supply chain, we study the interaction between the use of strategic inventory withholding by the buyer and the use of a direct selling channel (encroachment) by the supplier in the second period. The main model focuses on sequential quantity decisions where the buyer decides on its order quantity and sets its selling quantity, with a first-mover advantage, before the supplier decides on its direct selling quantity. In an extension, we also consider an alternative timing structure of simultaneous quantity competition, where the buyer loses its first-mover advantage. Our study provides useful managerial insights into the strategic (joint) moves of the players in a supply chain. We show that both the supplier and the buyer can benefit from vertical competition. Moreover, the first-mover advantage may not always increase profits for the players. I will also talk about a couple of other projects on supplier encroachment. One (accepted in Management Science) concerns a supplier’s distribution strategy when capacity is limited and another one (to be submitted to Marketing Science) looks at value of information sharing in dual distribution channels.
Huiqi Guan is a PhD candidate in the Department of Management, majoring in operations management at the School of Business Administration，University of Miami. His primary research interest is in supply chain management, especially interfacing issues with marketing, economics, and information systems. Guan’s research works have been accepted for publication in Management Science, and Manufacturing & Service Operations Management. He received the Outstanding PhD Student Award in 2017 from the University of Miami，School of Business Administration. Guan received his BS and MS from Tsinghua University in China.