讲座：Performance Incentives and Competition in Healthcare Markets
题 目：Performance Incentives and Competition in Healthcare Markets
演讲人：Prof. Sergei Savin, Department of Operations, Information and Decisions,
the Wharton School, U niversity of Pennsylvania
主持人：黄 丞 副教授 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院金融系
时 间：2017年11月15日 16:00-17:00
地 点：上海交通大学 徐汇校区上院S202
Performance-based compensation is gaining popularity as a mechanism to incentivize providers of healthcare services to improve standards of patient care delivery. This paper investigates the effects of introducing performance-based incentives in a competitive healthcare market. In particular, we consider a market in which a payer applies a performance-based compensation contract to competing hospitals. In our model, we use G/G/m queueing dynamics to describe the patient care process and assume that patient demand for care delivered by a particular hospital is increasing in the level of quality as well as the level of access to care that the hospital provides and is decreasing in the levels of quality and access at competing hospitals. Under a set of standard assumptions on the general structure of patient demand and patient benefit from care, as well as hospital cost and reimbursement functions, we derive sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in quality and access and duopoly case as well.
Professor Savin’s research expertise is centered on operational aspects of health care delivery, improving patient access to care, and optimal management of diagnostic and treatment capacity. His articles have appeared in Management Science, Operations Research, and Manufacturing and Service Operations Management, among others, and he also participates in editorial activities for several premier journals including Management Science, Operations Research, Manufacturing and Service Operations Management, and Production and Operations Management.