讲座：Why Branded Firms May Benefit from Counterfeit Competition
题 目：Why Branded Firms May Benefit from Counterfeit Competition
演讲人：Yucheng Ding, Assistant Professor of Economics, Wuhan University
主持人：车翼 博士 安泰经济与管理学院经济系
A durable-good monopolist sells its branded product over two periods. In period 2, when there is entry of a counterfeiter, the branded firm may charge a high price to signal its quality. Counterfeit competition thus enables the branded firm to commit to a high price in period 2, alleviating the classic time-inconsistency problem under a durable-good monopoly. This can increase the branded firm's profit by encouraging consumers to purchase without delay, despite the revenue loss to the counterfeiter. Total welfare can also increase, because early purchase eliminates delay cost and consumers enjoy the good for both periods.
Yucheng is an assistant professor in the School of Economics and Management in Wuhan University. He received his Ph.D. from University of Colorado Boulder. Yucheng’s research field include Industrial Organization and Applied Microeconomic Theory. His current research interests concentrate on counterfeit problem, conspicuous consumption and durable goods.