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Jiang Ming

Department of:  Economics

Associate Professor

Email:  mjiang@sjtu.edu.cn

English resume

Biography

Research

RESEARCH INTEREST

Experimental economics; behavioral economics; market design


WORK EXPERIENCE
August 2015 - August 2019: Assistant professor of economics, Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University

 August 2019 - present: Associate professor of economics, Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University

EDUCATION

Ph.D. Information, University of Michigan, 2015

B.A. Economics, Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, 2009

B.S. Mathematics, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, 2009


JOURNAL PUBLICATION

E. L. Krupka, S. Leider, M. Jiang. (2017). A Meeting of the Minds: Informal Agreements and Social Norms,  Management Science. 64:6, 1708-1729.

Y. Chen, M. Jiang, O. Kesten, S. Robin, M. Zhu. (2018). Matching in the Large: An Experimental Study, Games and Economic Behavior110, 295-317.

Y. Chen, M. Jiang, E. Krupka. (2019). Hunger and the Gender Gap. Experimental Economics. 22, 885–917.

M. Jiang, J. Li. (2019). TreeRing: A GameSafe Parser for z-Tree. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance. 22, 90-92 (TreeRing binary and source download:https://github.com/mjiangsjtu/treering )

Y. Chen, M. Jiang, O. Kesten. (forthcoming). An Empirical Evaluation of Chinese College Admissions Reforms Through A Natural Experiment, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences



PEER-REVIEWED CONFERENCE PUBLICATION

Structure and Reciprocity in Technology-centered Q&A Communities (With Tao Dong and Yung-Ju Chang), Proceedings of the Fifth International AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media (2011).


WORKING PAPER

When Do Stable Matching Mechanisms Fail? The Role of Standardized Tests in College Admissions

In this paper, I investigate matching problems where priorities and preferences are misaligned. In the case of centralized college admissions, students are matched based on their test scores in standardized tests (priorities), a noisy realization of their aptitudes (colleges' preferences) due to measurement errors. I show that in this case any matching mechanism that is stable with respect to priority is not stable with respect to preference. The resulting instability leads to market unraveling. However, a manipulable mechanism such as the Boston mechanism, combined with limited information about priorities, may succeed in mending this market failure. I then design and conduct a laboratory experiment where I compare the performance of two mechanisms (the Boston mechanism and the Deferred Acceptance mechanism), under two timing conditions of the submission of students' rank-ordered lists of colleges (before the exam and after the exam), using a market design with both one-sided centralized matching and two-sided decentralized early admissions. In the experiment, the Boston mechanism under pre-exam submission condition performs better than the Deferred Acceptance mechanism in reducing market unraveling, which confirms the theoretical predictions.


Promise-keeping Norms and Renegotiation Behavior (with Erin Krupka and Stephen Leider) Under review

The desire to uphold promise-keeping norms greases the wheels of interaction by creating trust. Norms establish a set of mutual expectations which parties rely on to interact in the presence of uncertainty and renegotiation. We present a model of social norm compliance in a risky trust game. We establish a set of assumptions about the norm that characterize how promises affect the norm to fulfill an agreement, how the norm is changed once unforeseen contingencies are resolved and is changed if a renegotiation request is accepted or rejected. Using these assumptions, the model makes predictions about behavior patterns in the risky trust game. We conduct an experiment to test predictions both of the behavior patterns and the assumptions of the model. We show that behavior is consistent with the norms model and that our assumptions about the norms are supported. Using this model, we explain why most subjects make promises, why promises are largely fulfilled even when it is costly, how renegotiation success or failure affects the propensity to fulfill the promise and why nearly half of subjects do not request costless renegotiation even if it is available. This work sheds light on the impact of norms to influence renegotiation and extends the promise-keeping literature. For policies written against the backdrop of strong norms, we address implications and guidelines.