嘉    宾：Takeshi Murooka 副教授 大阪大学

主持人： 闵炜程 助理教授 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院  

时    间：2024年3月13日(周三)14:00-15:30

地    点:  上海交通大学徐汇校区安泰经济与管理学院B207

内容简介：This paper considers a Bayesian learning problem where strategic players jointly learn an unknown economic state, and show that one's higher-order misspecification (i.e., one's misspecification about the opponent's misspecification) can have a significant impact on the equilibrium outcome. We consider a simple environmental problem where players' production, as well as an unknown state, affects the quality of the environment. Crucially, we assume that one of the players is unrealistically optimistic about the quality of the environment. When this optimism is common knowledge, the equilibrium outcome is continuous in the amount of optimism, and hence small optimism leads to approximately correct learning of the state. In contrast, when the optimism is not common knowledge and each player is unaware of the opponent having a different view about the world, the equilibrium outcome is discontinuous, and even vanishingly small optimism leads to completely incorrect learning. We then analyze a general Bayesian learning model and discuss when such discontinuity arises.

演讲人简介：Takeshi Murooka received PhD at UC Berkeley in 2014. After working at University of Munich (Germany) in 2014-2017 as an assistant professor, he moved to Osaka University (Japan) as an associate professor. His research fields are Psychology and Economics, Industrial Organization, Microeconomic Theory. He has published several papers on this research topic in leading economics journals, such as Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Public Economics and American Economic Journal: Microeconomics.