题  目：Network-Based Peer Monitoring Design

嘉  宾: 宋阳波 副教授 香港中文大学深圳校区

主持人: 闵炜程 助理教授 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院  

时  间: 2024年2月21日(周三)下午 14:00-15:30

地  点: 上海交通大学徐汇校区安泰经济与管理学院B207

内容简介：We study a team incentive design problem where multiple agents are located on a network and work on a joint project. The principal seeks the least costly mechanism to incentivize full efforts, by choosing the work assignment sequence and the rewards to the agents upon success. Whereas the agents’ actions are hidden to the principal, they may be observed among the agents given the internal information that is determined by the network and the sequence. Under effort complementarity, the transparency of the agents’ actions can reduce their incentive costs but with decreasing marginal effectiveness. For several typical network topologies, we derive explicit properties of an optimal assignment sequence, and propose a number of measures to rank networks in terms of total cost and stability.

演讲人简介：Yangbo Song is currently an associate professor of economics at CUHK (Shenzhen). He got his Ph.D. in economics from University of California, Los Angeles. His research interests include game theory and its applications, information economics and network economics. He has published articles in a number of academic journals, such as JET, GEB, ET, JEBO, etc.